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The psychoanalytical treatment of defense neuroses has classically consisted of the 
analysand’s free association in combination with the analyst’s floating attention and 
interpretation of the unconscious desire. Transference refers to both the context in which this 
process unfolds and the reason why it happens. In other words, the theoretical standards 
guiding the technical and metapsychological approaches to such cases usually revolve around 
repression, with hysteria as the model. However, patients whose top layer of suffering is related 
to their narcissistic identity demonstrate as little tolerance to that approach as they do benefit 
from it. Such clinical types have several different designations and are classified by terminologies 
pertaining to a wide variety of clinical configurations. Among other nomenclatures, these clinical 
types have been designated as current pathologies, borderline states, non-neurotic structures 
or narcissistic pathologies. They present, among other, false selves, as if personalities, blank or 
empty selves, basic failures etc. Regardless of the term chosen or the characteristic highlighted, 
and considering the metapsychological peculiarities of each nomenclature, these forms of 
psychological suffering generally present important limitations in terms of symbolizing, 
representing and elaborating capabilities and are thus considered refractory to analyses. Clinical 
practice involving these patients usually addresses the triumph of the act over the word, hence 
being designated pathologies of the act, difficult cases, or pathologies of emptiness. 
Although the etiology of such cases have been attributed to events involving the 
(non)consolidation of primary narcissistic processes in childhood, we believe it is possible to 
apply the same metapsychological understanding to another type of subjective suffering in 
which threats to the sense of identity may also be recognized as some sort of a posteriori attacks 
to primary narcissism. We observed that psychopathological conditions established after 
experiencing cognitive impairment derived from neurological illness consist of clinical 
configurations that impose limits on the classical psychoanalytical treatment similarly to the 
phenomena that can be observed in narcissistic identity disorder. 
If we assume, as proposed by Green (1966-1967/1988), that primary narcissism is a 
structure and not only a specific state within psychological development, whose maintenance 
must be guaranteed in order to function as a narcissistic support, we can think of cases in which 
that structure becomes fragile not while it is being built but rather because of later problems 
that radically affect the possibilities of individuation and symbolization. Just as in narcissistic 
pathologies with early etiologies, the possibility of the elaboration of anxiety, which is far 
different from neurotic castration anxiety, is expressed as the fear of the annihilation and 
collapse of the ego, who, paradoxically, is no longer consistent or cohesive. 
Thus, we present the hypothesis that the psychopathological condition that develops 
after the perception and experience of cognitive impairment demonstrates similarities with both 
narcissistic identity pathologies and traumatic neurosis. This hypothesis was developed based 
on the studies “Do cérebro à palavra: a clínica com pacientes neurológicos” (“From the brain to 
the word: practice with neurological patients”) and “Aspectos subjetivos do adoecimento 
neurológico” (“Subjective aspects of neurological illness”), which were both performed in PUC-
Rio, with support from FAPERJ (processes number E-26/101.498/2010 and E.26/102.784/2011) and 
CNPq (process number 305175/2012-2), and were approved by the PUC-Rio research ethics 
committee. Each patient gave his/her informed consent for all the clinical sessions. 
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Among the reasons supporting our hypothesis, two aspects are essential. Firstly, clinical 
practice has shown that a patient’s perception and experience of impairment, especially when it 
affects important cognitive functions, destabilize the feeling of identity and continuity of 
subjective existence, dissolving the egoic cohesion that is supported by both primary narcissism 
and the functions of the ego sustained by cognition. Secondly, we have observed that the 
impossibility of the elaboration of the perception and of the experience of cognitive impairment, 
due to their very existence, freezes those subjects permanently in the present time, engendering 
repetition compulsion processes in an effort to perform elaboration and symbolization, and, at 
the same time, discharge (Winograd, Klautau & Sollero-de-Campos, 2014). 
The brain injuries in question here, which result in severe cognitive impairments, occur 
either after specific abrupt injuries, as with strokes or traumatic brain injury, or in gradual events, 
as with degenerative disease (Alzheimer’s disease or primary progressive aphasia). It is 
important to highlight the traumatic impact of these neurologic events, and not only the 
neurological problems, since it will affect the whole identity and further radically disorganize the 
psychic economy of the patient. 
Freud (1923) identified and described a few egoic functions, positing that the general 
function of the ego involves intrapsychic moderation (antinomic function), as well as moderation 
between the psyche and the environment. For him, the ego’s essential functions are as follows: 
(1) induction to the secondary process; (2) motility control; (3) perception; (4) reality check; (5) 
anticipation; (6) temporal organization of psychic processes; (7) rational thinking (synthesis); 
and (8) inhibitory functions, especially rationalization, pretermitting, postponement and 
defenses against instinctual demands, such as censorship and repression. Undeniably, almost all 
of these egoic functions are internally supported by cognitive functions (perception, attention, 
memory, language, and executive functions), and help to maintain intra- and intersubjective 
limits. Alterations in these functions (cognitive and, consequently, egoic) result in variations and 
disturbances in the relationship of the subject with both him/herself and with the environment. 
These may include important difficulties in the inhibition of primary processes and in the 
management of instinctual demands, temporal disorganization of psychic processes, loosening 
of reality checks, difficulty in synthesis, differentiation, and, more specifically, important 
limitations in the capabilities of symbolization and representation. In cases of patients 
presenting brain injuries or neurological diseases, we have observed that, after realizing that 
they have one or more egoic functions impaired by cognitive dysfunctions, they undergo a 
violent disorganization of the whole psyche rather than just of the ego. A traumatic neurosis 
blended with some sort of posterior early trauma seems to become triggered as if the ego, in 
particular, and the intrasubjective limits were gradually decomposed. 
Therefore, the clinical and metapsychological issues raised by cases such as these have 
been posing challenges for contemporary psychoanalysis. As stated by Malabou (2007), the 
study of the impact of neurological illness on the continuity of the psychic life and the study of 
the subject’s vulnerability to such impacts reveal that the fundamental problem here is also the 
incidence of trauma, which has recently become a central issue in modern psychopathology. 
For Freud (1920), a traumatic event necessarily presents two faces, one of which is 
exogenous and the other of which is endogenous. The exogenous one results from its sudden 
and surprising occurrence. The endogenous one refers to how this exteriority is elaborated by 
the psyche so that it becomes integrated (or not) in the subject’s history. The traumatic aspect 
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of the subjective experience of a neurological illness with cognitive impairment implies both 
faces. It is the occurrence of something that, because of its virulence and violence, belongs in 
the realm of the meaninglessness, being unrepresented, unthinkable, derived from 
discontinuous transformation, frequently sudden, and something through which the identity 
gets dissolved. It is an event that, despite surely having an endogenous face, is felt as exogenous 
by the psyche. Indeed, as highlighted by Malabou (2007), when a neurological illness with 
cognitive impairment affects the psychic identity of a subject, some level of articulation of the 
exogenous and endogenous contents is revealed. In addition, their specificity is refractory to any 
symbolization attempt. The extraneous character of the accident remains extraneous to the 
psyche, as something exterior inside the interior, not assimilable, which demands the subject to 
face the narcissistic wounds that untwist the thread of his/her history and suspend its course. 
That is, why the accident may be understood as an unfortunate encounter with the Real, i.e., 
with some intimate exteriority (Porge, 2000) or with some radical internal exteriority (Cardoso, 
2011) which, not being assimilable for or by the subject, and, therefore, not representative, 
promotes the intensification of the death instinct and the amplification of its effects. 
Thus, clinical practice involving patients who suffer from cognitive impairments derived 
from neurological illness reminds us that the conceptual investigation involved in psychoanalysis 
must always acknowledge a relationship of “dependent concomitance” between the brain and 
subjectivity, as proposed by Freud (1891), conversely from a relationship of contraposition, 
juxtaposition, or causality (Winograd, 2013). It is indeed possible to observe several common 
characteristics in the destructive effects of trauma on the psyche, irrespective of whether its 
triggering cause is organic or psychic (as if separating them were possible). In every case, some 
unexpected event, also impossible to elaborate on, happens. 
 
The actual, the unrepresentable and repetition compulsion   
 
If it is correct to state that the occurrence of a sudden or a degenerative brain injury with 
cognitive impairment disorganizes the functioning of neural systems and structures, it is also 
correct to say that subjective experience as a whole is profoundly affected as well. In general, 
subjects with neurological diseases can no longer count on the subjective coordinates that have 
usually structured the cohesion of their ego since the cognitive impairment have imposed more 
or less radical limits on their representational capabilities. 
In many cases, it is possible to observe some sort of conviction that lost and inaccessible 
memories must be recovered to restore the subjective impairment caused by forgetting words, 
names, people, places, and situations that compose a past that is no longer recognized as their 
own. Such references are supplied by cognitive functions and its loss is experienced as a 
traumatic wound that divides the subjective experience into before and after the unhealthy 
event, convulsing the whole of the psychic organization and destabilizing the feeling of identity 
and continuity of existence. When the subject experiences the sensation of an ego in ruins, 
he/she searches for cohesion through the belief that it is possible to recover what was lost, 
returning to the way things were before. The nostalgic feeling derived from the subjective 
experience of having lost a part of themselves drives the desire to return to their lost identity. 
The project is actually a protective measure to address the anxiety provoked by the ongoing 
disease process. 
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One of the patients in our study, who had suffered from a stroke a few years before and 
still faces impairments because of the disease, confessed to the analyst as follows: “I wanted an 
answer; if I will be cured of this or not. I don’t know if I am handicapped or not (...). I have a 
problem, but if I get on a bus no one gives up the seat for me because no one can see anything 
wrong with me. No one knows I had a stroke. Sometimes I need to get a seat but I just have to 
keep standing. Therefore, it seems that we, who had strokes, don’t exist. There is no free pass, 
there’s nothing… let’s say, no help”. The patient complained about the fact that her limitations 
could not be visually recognized and expressed her anguishes referred to her feeling of non-
existence. 
The same fragility of the feeling of existence is implicit in the visible satisfaction of 
another patient when showing to the analyst an identification badge with his name and a short 
description of his clinical diagnosis. The badge, manufactured by the speech therapy sector 
where he was undergoing treatment, was used by him in social circumstances in which he faced 
challenges in communicating with strangers. To avoid any misunderstandings about his health 
condition, the badge said: “I am aphasic. I had a stroke. I’m facing difficulty in speaking and 
understanding. I need time and your help to communicate. I do not have a mental disorder”. This 
badge seemed to provide him with some identification elements that guaranteed, though 
precariously, the feeling of continuous existence. 
We verified through our research that the feeling of the loss of part of oneself reenacts 
the repertoire of defenses against the helplessness experienced in previous traumas. Although 
the perception of cognitive impairment is unequivocally a traumatic blow to the psyche, its 
psychopathological effects do not always result from a single trauma. Initially, many patients 
nurture the hope that their cognitive impairment will be overcome. That does not always occur 
even though speech therapy and neurocognitive rehabilitation treatments do provide significant 
improvement. In these specific cases, the relevant issue is that the perception that the cognitive 
impairment derived from the neurological injury remains over time leads to the insidious 
installation of a series of little traumas. As these little traumas accumulate, they disrupt the unity 
of the ego and damage the whole of the psychic organization, solving its internal and external 
limits. 
The concept of cumulative trauma, elaborated by Masud Khan (1963), gives us resources 
that help to understand the idea. Khan (1963) assumes that failures of the function responsible 
for protecting the developing psyche provoke little fissures in the ego during development and 
acquire traumatic value both cumulatively and retrospectively. That is, the traumatic effects of 
these fissures is not caused by the events at the very moment they occur, i.e., when the fissures 
are oppened, but rather silently and invisibly by repetition and accumulation of such cracks. In 
other words, over the duration of the illness, the subject gradually accumulates wounds which 
are initially imprinted by the realization of the cognitive impairment and the damage to the egoic 
functions, followed by the perception of the permanence of the losses. This gradual collection 
of wounds affects the consistency and the solidity of the primary narcissism, resulting in the 
impossibility of recognizing the self as being whole and continuous, as well as in the impossibility 
of finding support in one’s own perceptions and representations of him/herself and the world. 
In Beyond the pleasure principle (Freud, 1920), trauma was described as an experience that 
could not be processed psychically at the moment it occurs since its high intensity bursts the 
psyche’s protective shield, tearing apart the psychic fabric that is totally unprepared to address 
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it. In the text, Freud developed the idea that an exterior trauma may provoke an enormous 
disturbance in the psyche’s energetic economy, activating all the possible defensive measures 
and temporarily suspending regulation according to the pleasure principle. Since the protective 
shield is damaged and is no longer able to prevent the psychic apparatus from being flooded 
with large amounts of stimuli, another issue arises: namely, the control of the intensity of stimuli 
flowing inside and its psychic binding so it can be adequately discharged. That is the very function 
of traumatic dreams: to repeatedly bring the subjects back to the situation when the trauma 
occurred to help them retrospectively master the excessive stimuli through the development of 
anxiety, which absence  allowed the deflagration of the traumatic neurosis. In this way, we can 
understand the anxious remarks of a severely aphasic patient in almost all his sessions of the 
period he designated “postsurgical”, which consisted of a repeated recall, a rumination, taking 
him back to the traumatic experience of realizing he had lost part of his cognitive capabilities. 
His reference to “postsurgical” could be explained by the fact that his neurological impairment 
had occurred a few days after he had underwent cardiac surgery, which resulted in the 
occurrence of an ischemic stroke and the development of severe aphasia. 
Therefore, if, on the one hand, the continuous perception of a neurological impairment 
works as some sort of dissolution of primary narcissism, on the other hand, its 
psychopathological effects are similar to the ones of a traumatic neurosis. Simone Korff-Sausse 
(2001), in dealing with trauma in parents of children with physical disabilities, highlighted the 
following elements, which can also be detected here: (1) unpreparedness of the psyche, (2) 
experience of terror and agony (more than fear and anxiety), (3) failure of the symbolization 
capability, (4) consequent predominance of the unrepresentable, and (5) psychic sideration or 
fragmentation without the possibility of mourning. In other words, the experience goes beyond 
the metabolizing capability of the ego because of both its intensity and its consequences. As if 
the sudden intimacy with death were not enough and excessive in itself (Barrois, 1998), patients 
with cognitive impairments derived from neurological illness can no longer count on the skills 
that enabled proper functioning of the ego and, namely, necessary elaboration. Taken by illness 
and captured by trauma, these patients freeze in time, astounded at the presence of their 
impairment and facing a moment of rupture between a lost past and a rejected future. 
The psychic experience of time being frozen reveals a psychic functioning characterized 
by immobility and suffocation of the psychic life. One of our patients revealed this exact type of 
psychic organization as she mainly resorted to repetition compulsion mechanism. Having had a 
stroke that provoked some motor impairment several years before, the patient was fixated in a 
position of total displeasure with life, presenting traces of pessimism and hopelessness. She lived 
with her elderly mother, who became the main object of the patient’s hatred and resentment 
and the depositary of the responsibility for the patient’s stagnation, although the patient herself 
showed signs of intense dependence on her mother. The patient resented the fact that her 
physical difficulties, seen as a true absence of any capability, prevented her from doing manual 
tasks that would have been a source of pleasure in the past. She viewed herself as someone 
completely incapable of doing any professional or leisure activity, which inhibited her from 
imagining modes of existence that could bring any vitality or pleasure into her psychic world. The 
narrative of her childhood brought up the traumatic relationship with her primary objects, 
allowing the assumption that her symptomatology dated from earlier stages. That did not stop 
us from realizing the essential role played by the illness in the intensification of her defenses.  
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The beginning of her analytical work seemed initially fruitful. She then started to develop 
themes linked to sexuality and to express the desire for a love relationship, imagining the 
possibility of investing new objects libidinally. At fifty, she had very few intimate experiences 
with men. Nevertheless, she decided to join a dating website and was able to arrange a few dates. 
Those attempts of psychic movement soon showed failures because the struggle to establish a 
love relationship frustrated her intensely, thus confirming her idea that life would only bring her 
sorrow and dissatisfaction. It is relevant to say that, among the impairments of the stroke, the 
patient later started to have isolated convulsive crises, which provoked great insecurity and 
made her prefer to stay alone more often, doomed to stay home with her mother. This clinical 
circumstance led to some stagnation in the analytical process coupled by her repeated efforts in 
keeping herself in a frozen and immovable position. It was as if the patient performed, in a 
repetition compulsion movement, her fantasy of “non-modification of the actual,” (Aulagnier, 
1979, p. 122), which was maintained through the complaints about her mother and the 
impairment derived from the illness. 
However, if a sideration regarding a traumatic event expresses a tendency toward 
psychic immobility, given the impossibility of symbolization, it also reveals an effort towards 
symbolization. Therefore, as we will see, when a repetition compulsion arrives on the scene 
being driven by death instinct, that may and should be understood certainly as what is keeping 
the subject in a deadly movement but, at the same time, as the act of gathering the necessary 
forces for the subjectivation process in order to reestablish intra- and intersubjective limits. 
According to Freud (1920), the purpose of a repetition compulsion is to dominate the excess 
stimuli and to be involved in the process of linkage of free energy. In other words, since stimuli 
cannot be metabolized psychically due to its intensity, thus dissolving the logic of the pleasure 
principle, the mechanism of  repetition compulsion becomes active in an effort at the same time 
paralyzing and willing to evacuate and manage the energy that cannot be metabolized yet. 
Green (2000) refers to this as a paradox, that is, the same energy that is repeatedly needed in 
the attempts to elaborate is, at each discharge, temporarily emptied from the psyche, liberating 
it from the tensions that would permit  the enrichment of its organization, the improvement of 
its functioning, the enlargement of its field of activity, and the diversification of its investments, 
grading its answers. 
This sort of fixation engendered by a trauma differs, in essence, from a libidinal fixation. 
That is, while the latter classically expresses a connection of the libido to certain ways of 
obtaining satisfaction, namely, to certain characteristic organizations of its developmental 
phases, the first reveals, on the contrary, a disorganizing and undifferentiating movement that 
is a side effect of the intensification of the death instinct. Therefore, because of the impossibility 
of psychic inscription and transcription, a repetition compulsion is equivalent to time becoming 
dead (Green, 2000). What the discharge does not cease to evacuate, without being able to do it 
once and for all, can not be transformed nor assimilated. It becomes fixated and impossible to 
be articulated in a representational grid, thus unable to construct historicity. The consequences 
of this are the freezing and paralyzing of time, the suspension of the pleasure principle and, more 
significantly, the failure of the attempts for its implementation, all of which are characteristics 
that can also be found in cases in which psychic suffering are caused by very early traumas. 
In a small passage from 1939, in “Moses and monotheism”, Freud briefly indicated the 
influence of early trauma in early infancy (until approximately the fifth year of age) on the 
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development of neuroses as follows: “The impressions we experienced at an early age and 
forgot later, to which I have ascribed such great importance for the etiology of the neuroses, are 
called traumata” (1939, p. 91). He complemented later with the following: “The traumata are 
either bodily experiences or perceptions, especially something heard or seen; that is to say, they 
are either experiences or impressions” (p.93). However, the terms “impressions”, “bodily 
perceptions” and, to a certain extent, “experiences”, although relatively impossible to be 
precisely defined, mean that something that has been experienced left marks which became 
fixated as traces from a period before language acquisition, before its transcription into some 
representation. 
We should remember that the beginning of the construction of the psyche is based on 
the first bodily sensations associated with the pleasure or displeasure, which leave psychic 
impressions. In his famous “Letter 52” (1896/1994), Freud posited the occurrence of three basic 
levels of inscriptions (Niederschrift) for the organization of the psychic apparatus as follows: 
0. The first inscription consists of perceptual signs (Wahrnehmungzeichen), which are formed by 
psychic impressions derived from perception (Wahrnehmungen) and are simultaneously 
associated, being entirely accessible to consciousness. 
 
1. The second inscription consists of unconsciousness (Unbewusstsein), composed of 
mnemonic traces organized, no longer by simultaneity, but possibly also by causality. 
2. The third inscription is preconsciousness (Vorbewusstsein), which involves word-
representations. That register would correspond to our official self, that is, what will later 
constitute the ego. 
 
The assumption of the inscription of something beyond representation is easily 
recognizable, though roughly formulated, being the basis upon which the ego is formed, through 
retranscription of one layer into another. As Freud himself taught (1896), we should not suppose 
that, in passing from one level to another, that the initial inscription would disappear. Conversely, 
the three levels coexist and, in the same way that not all of the unconscious content reaches 
consciousness, not all of the content of one of the inscriptions will reach another. 
In 1900, in chapter VII of “Interpretation of dreams” (Freud, 1900), Freud, revisiting the 
theme of psychic inscriptions, developed the idea that the first representations would be 
composed of mnemonic traces of pleasure and displeasure associated with bodily sensations. 
These representations would gradually evolve from the primary process, which is characteristic 
of unconscious processes, into the secondary process, which is typical of the ego, through the 
growing possibility of simultaneous and contiguous associations. Here, an approximation with 
Letter 52 is possible as follows: from the inscription of perception signs to the subsequent 
inscription (still unconscious) and from there to the third inscription of conscious marks. 
Dependency on the automatic discharge of bodily sensations would diminish as available 
representations are augmented. In other words, a repetition compulsion would lose its intensity 
as the availability of the representations that are prone to convey excitement increased. 
Early traumas and, to a certain extent, present traumas, would then be inscribed on the 
first level of inscription, that is, the level regarding the perceptual signs. They would be 
registered but not yet established as traces and not organized into representations of any kind. 
Although we can already speak of impressions and, therefore, of mnemonic marks that are 
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inscribed, we are still operating at the level of the non-representable or, better yet, the 
unrepresented. If we assume the idea that a repetition compulsion is a natural and necessary 
process for psychic constitution, as its function is to manage the excitation that reaches the 
psychic apparatus through its articulation on the representational grid (Freud, 1920), it is possible 
to understand that, in cases of both early trauma and traumatic neurosis, the effort for the 
representational metabolization of excitation (including the instinctual ones) is the relevant 
mechanism. It is also possible to understand that the psychic apparatus could not perform the 
process at the very moment it was reached by the excitation, when the trauma was produced. 
As stated above, the more there are representations available, the less there is automatic 
discharge, and thus, the shorter the reach of a repetition compulsion. In cases of neurological 
illness with cognitive impairment, we observe some sort of reversed mechanism; neurologic 
damage operates the dissolution of variable portions of the representational grid until the realm 
of the first inscription (perception signs). It would be as if the psyche became discontinuous, 
undifferentiated, and non-integrated psychic zones, far beyond the pleasure principle, were 
gradually developed, disconnecting the previous connections. Such are the fueros that Freud 
mentioned in the “Project” (Freud, 1895) and recalled in his book on Moses (Freud, 1939) as 
follows: “They are as a state within a state, an inaccessible party, useless for the common weal; 
yet they can succeed in overcoming the other, the so-called normal, component and forcing it 
into their service” (Freud, 1939, p. 95). Of course, there are important differences among the 
subjects who have had just a few cognitive functions impaired and those with degenerative 
diseases whose functions deteriorate continuously. We could formulate the hypothesis that, 
regarding the first ones, the fueros are circumscribed, as if there were walls around them and, 
with respect to the second ones, the territory of the fueros is in continuous expansion, 
suffocating psychic life both literally and metaphorically. The fact that the fueros are in expansion 
in cases in which the process of neurological deterioration is gradual seems to provoke the 
feeling of the loss of the self as even more significant. In these cases, before the condition 
deteriorates drastically, the subject follows the insidious and uninterrupted loss of his/her 
cognitive skills and, in this way, experiences a more radical feeling of the impoverishment of the 
ego. 
This is what we could observe in the case of a patient in our study who was diagnosed 
with progressive primary aphasia and whose psychic pain included the anguish of disintegration 
and psychic death. Sometimes the patient would come to the point of expressing suicidal ideas 
as a last resort for facing the imminence of psychic death and annihilation of the ego. Her psychic 
suffering was closely articulated with the perception that the continuity of her existence was 
broken. This perception was repeated every time she missed words when she was making an 
effort to communicate her thoughts. The cognitive impairment made the patient experience a 
feeling of extreme impotence, causing her to react with frequent self-recriminations and 
offenses. In repeated situations, when she unsuccessfully tried to recall a certain word or even 
mixed syllables, she would get intensely frustrated and would cover her face with her hands, 
complaining and lightly hitting her own head. The experience of deadly horror was reenacted in 
each event of forgetfulness and would place her in the realm of a repetition compulsion, fixated 
on the search for that specific lost word. Fortunately, the psychoanalytical treatment helped her 
to start inventing new ways to address these events of forgetfulness, namely, resorting to other 
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strategies to communicate her thoughts, be it trying to express ideas close to the one initially 
thought through drawings on paper or even using bodily gestures during the session. 
Although it is possible to differentiate between conditions with localized neurological 
loss and those with degenerative disease, we observe an intensification of the death instinct in 
both cases, certainly as a psychopathological effect of unbinding. However, the work of the 
death instinct may be understood, even more radically, as some recruitment of forces to 
engender the reconstitution and reintegration of what was deconstructed and disintegrated. 
 
Death instinct and subjective constitution 
 
The binding function mentioned by Freud in (1920) “Beyond the pleasure principle” as 
being the essential function of the psychic apparatus is, indeed, the action of coating and 
covering, that is, the production of representations that are able to organize the world through 
the capture and management of excitation. This binding work is a function of the ego, which is 
responsible, as we have seen, for the synthesis, the integration, and the inhibition processes, 
among others, in some sort of returning movement to the same, of searching what is familiar 
and of covering everything that seems to be a threat to its structural permanence (Scarfone, 
2013). In other words, the ego welcomes what is new only if it can assimilate, bind, or make the 
content similar to what it already knows and place it in its established representational universe. 
It is classically said that the ego renews and transforms itself, becoming an effect of the binding 
processes fed by the life instinct. However, if it is correct to say that the maintenance of the limits 
of the ego depends on the life instinct, it is equally correct to say that there would be no limits 
without the work of the death instinct, in a continuous resume of the subjective constitution 
processes. Deepening our understanding, we could say that, on the same time that the 
individuation of the ego is related to the activities of  integration, synthesis, and objectification, 
it significantly depends on the death instinct and its effects of unbinding, non-objectification, 
and negation (Green, 1988). 
As taught by Garcia-Roza (1986), although the concept of the death instinct was 
elaborated in 1920, it was only in 1925, in the article on negation, that this concept would have 
suffered its deepest and most definitive theoretical transformation. In a comment made during 
one of Lacan’s seminaries, Hyppolite ([1955]1966) highlighted the fact that what Freud offered 
in his article were hypotheses on the genesis of thought based on negation. The following two 
passages of the Freudian text deserve mention: “Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what 
is repressed; indeed, it is already suspending of repression, though not, of course, an acceptance 
of what is repressed. We can see how this intellectual function is separated here from the 
affective process” (Freud, 1925, p. 254) and “Affirmation – as a substitute for uniting – belongs 
to Eros; negation – the successor to expulsion – belongs to the instincts of destruction” (Freud, 
1925, p. 256). 
The first passage expresses the idea that the intellectual results of the suspension present 
in the function of negation, from which repression is not totally eliminated, since what was 
denied remains as such. When the analyst reveals what was denied to a patient and the patient 
accepts it rationally, says Freud (1925), he denies his negation, but the repressed is not integrated 
into the ego because of that. Green (2011) explains that, here, the same operation allows 
something to reach the conscious ego and reinforces the refusal to admit it as part of the ego. 
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Because of that, the resulting affirmation (as a negation of a negation) is purely intellectual and 
is far different from the original affective affirmation. 
If we go back to the moment the ego was constituted, we will be able to acknowledge 
that before the acquisition of language (and the possibility of saying “no”), the baby was 
dominated by a “yes”, by a sort of primitive affect, without the possibility, provided by language, 
of being apart from the experience (Garcia-Roza, 1986). Based on that, as in the second passage 
mentioned above, Freud (1925) articulated the act of judging with the mechanisms of 
introjection and expulsion. In addition, these were respectively articulated with the sexual and 
the death instincts. He explains that, despite the fact that the mechanisms of expulsion and 
introjection obey the pleasure principle, the judgment of negation escapes that principle, being 
its very condition of possibility. 
The judgment of affirmation or negation may be configured as a judgment of attribution 
(affirms or denies possessing something) or existence (affirms or denies the real existence of a 
representation that belongs to the ego). The first case is about the incorporation of something 
experienced as good into the ego because of the action of the life instinct or the expulsion from 
the ego of something experienced as bad as a consequence and an action of the death instinct. 
Similarly, the second case is about the internal and external contents not in terms of what is 
good or bad but of what is real or unreal. In the latter case, the pleasure principle is not 
determining. Freud (1925) wrote that the original ego-pleasure wants to introject all that is good 
and expel whatever is bad. Contents that are bad, strange, or exterior to the ego are initially 
identical among themselves. 
Indeed, those formulations relate to the process of the formation of the ego and the 
object. They result from the action of the life instinct (union/introjection) but also from the death 
instinct (disunity/ expulsion). Hyppolite ([1955]1966) states that “the primitive affirmation is 
nothing else but affirming; but denying is more than wanting to destroy” (p. 391). In other words, 
there would be a primitive affirmation corresponding to the initial form of the relationship 
between a baby and his/her mother, an affective relationship par excellence which is purely 
affirmative for being the direct expression of the instinctual, previous to any repression, previous 
to any individuation or constitution of subjective limits. Then, there would be a negation of that 
primitive affirmation, under the form of the original repression, that is, not operated by the 
subject because he is its result and not its agent. It produces inscriptions which fix the instinct 
onto the representative-representational. Thus, the condition of the possibility of the 
establishment of the differentiation between the ego and the non-ego is as follows: what is bad 
is denied and expelled, and what is good can now be introjected in a movement of weaving the 
fabric of the egoic limits. 
If we consider the intrinsic relationship between introjection, affirmation and the sexual 
instinct, as well as between expulsion, negation, and the death instinct, we will be able to state 
that the death instinct is what performs the separation between the ego/non-ego, the 
constitution of the object and, consequently, the structuring of the psyche. In other words, 
negation, which is deeply linked to the action of the death instinct, is necessary for the 
construction and structuring of the psychic space. We cannot say, however, that the life instinct 
is unimportant in this process. On the contrary, without its processes there would be no psychic 
constitution. But, without the very processes operated by the death instinct, inter- and 
intrasubjective limits could not be established as well. Therefore, we may say that the 
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intensification and amplification of the death instinct in cases in which the subjective limits are 
undefined are an act of recruitment of constitutive forces. Their psychopathological effects are, 
then, side effects, which, many times, cannot be neutralized. 
In 1911, Freud had already approached those issues, although he had not yet coined the 
concept of the death instinct. In his article on the two principles of psychic functioning (Freud, 
1911), he declared that a psychic apparatus that was ruled exclusively by the pleasure principle 
and, therefore, ignorant of reality would probably be doomed to death for being unable to 
perform the judgment of existence. In the case of a baby, however, we know that the absence 
derived from the hallucinatory satisfaction is usually overcome by the offering of the mother’s 
breast. However, if that was so all the time, it would be impossible for the baby to create the 
distinction between his mother’s breast and his own body, mixing the fantasized and the real 
breasts. It means that it is necessary for the baby to lose the object and to separate 
himself/herself minimally from the mother to individuate and to be able to operate the reality 
check or the judgment of existence. We have mentioned above that this individuation results 
from the death instinct processes, such as disunion, because while the baby cannot distinguish 
his own body from the mother's breast, he is still a closed system in which it is not possible to 
separate the subject from an object (Green, 2011). This situation will only be dismantled and the 
closed system will be opened when an absence of satisfaction occurs, provoking a deception 
that leads to the renouncement of the hallucinatory satisfaction. With that, the pleasure 
principle will be transformed into the reality principle and the kind of judgment in operation will 
no longer be the one distinguishing between good and bad but rather the one distinguishing 
between what is real and what is hallucinatory. 
Such changes in the psychic functioning result from the loss of the primary object, the 
separation, and the disjunction that is operated particularly by the death instinct, which 
necessarily involves movements of repetition. That is why Green (1979) could affirm that if, on 
the one hand, the function of the primary object in constituting the psyche involves protecting, 
containing, binding the instinct discharge; on the other hand, the primary object needs to let 
itself efface, since its absence is essential for the consolidation of an individuated psychic 
apparatus opened and capable of other investments. In other words, that separation is 
necessary so that the primary object may be internalized and transformed into a framing 
structure, necessary space of absence. Evidently, such structuring loss cannot be abrupt but 
must be gradual enough not to be experienced as such. In other words, the quality of the 
relationship with the primary object is the condition in which the absence may be established in 
a positive way: it is a function of the object to stimulate and awaken the instinct as much as it is 
to contain it and make it tolerable. 
All this enables us to realize that the death instinct, far from being a (self) destructive 
principle inherent to the organism, can and should be regarded as accomplishing a mission in 
psychic survival with respect to traumatic flooding. As posed by Ferenczi (1934), it is 
unacceptable that there is no resistance regarding psychic commotion. That is, the following is 
how we understand the death instinct in trauma: “in a relationship of forces with no way out, 
only some resistance born from its own death instinct sources is able to confront the threat of a 
mortal danger” (Zaltzman, 1994, p. 64). Therefore, in cases of neurological illness with cognitive 
impairment, as well as in cases in which the main psychic functioning is in “traumatic mode” 
(Janin, 2005), we certainly witness an increase in the death instinct as a result of trauma. 
 
 
Winograd, Monah. Klautau, Perla. The irrepresentable, the repetition and the death instinct: 
psychoanalysis and neurologic illness  
 
 
| Analytica | São João del-Rei | v. 7 | n. 12 | Janeiro/Junho de 2018 | 
13 
However, instead of this being only a psychopathological expression of failure in symbolizing 
and elaborating the unrepresented, it is some kind of gathering of forces, a vital protest and a 
necessary resistance for psychic structuring and for the reestablishment of the limits that were 
more or less dissolved as a consequence of the lack of cognitive functions support. 
It is not hard to come to the conclusion that situations such as those demand some 
adaptation of the psychoanalytical technique usually structured upon free association, floating 
attention and interpretation of repressed contents. As we will see, clinical practice with these 
patients differs from the classical psychoanalytical one in considerably important aspects. 
 
Psychoanalysis as a therapeutic device for patients with neurological issues 
 
Until recently, clinical care for neurological patients was centered on neurology and 
neuropsychology (Sury & Sano, 1999 e Miller, 1993). The treatment focused on brain, cognitive 
and motor losses suffered by the subject because of his illness, neglecting the psychotherapeutic 
approaches and prioritizing rehabilitation of the cognitive functions. In turn, the traditional 
psychoanalytic practice did not accept this type of case for having specialized in treating 
problems of psychological etiology, having left the spectrum of pathologies of neurological 
etiologies to the fields of neurology and neuropsychology. According to our experience, and 
taking into account the possible enormous cognitive limitations, the biggest challenge was 
building a narrative from which it would be possible to establish an elaboration path for the 
traumatic blow. Because of the limitations, it is evident that the analyst cannot count on the 
recovery of memories that the mind can no longer access. As in narcissistic identity disorders, 
the material available to the analytical work scarcely belongs to the representation realm. 
Therefore, we understand that only through affect will a path for subjective elaboration and 
reconstruction be established. 
We have observed a growing appreciation for the affective aspects of analytical function 
in the present psychoanalytical literature as being detrimental to an attitude in which the 
analyst’s neutrality is mostly demanded. The capability and availability of the analyst to be 
psychically affected by the encounter with the analysand has been emphasized so that the 
analyst takes a more active role in face of the affects produced in the transferential relationship. 
However, it is important to remark that the opinion that is in favor of the analyst’s affects 
in practice does not reflect the Freudian position on the theme. As is known, Freud expressed 
objections with respect to the affective responses on the part of the analyst during treatment 
and recommended caution and explicit effort to refrain from them. His opinion on the subject 
can be seen in his considerations on the concept of countertransference. Although passages in 
which the topic of countertransference are directly approached are rare, Freud clearly states 
that he thinks that countertransference jeopardizes the treatment, being necessary to be 
overcome (Freud, 1915 [1914]). 
Nevertheless, post-Freudian analysts turned countertransference into a theme of 
increasing attention, especially since psychoanalytical treatment has been gradually evaluated 
regarding its relational dimension, that is, as a “dialogue situation” (Green, 2008), wherein both 
the analyst and the analysand are immersed. 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1982) very briefly reminded that the limits of the concept have 
been extremely varied. While some have understood that all the aspects of the analyst’s 
 
 
Winograd, Monah. Klautau, Perla. The irrepresentable, the repetition and the death instinct: 
psychoanalysis and neurologic illness  
 
 
| Analytica | São João del-Rei | v. 7 | n. 12 | Janeiro/Junho de 2018 | 
14 
personality would intervene in clinical practice, others have restricted countertransference to 
the psychic processes (conscious or unconscious) that the patient’s transference engenders in 
the analyst. Still, regarding the delimitation of the concept, opinions vary with respect to the 
terminological distinctions between the pair transference and countertransference, distinctions 
that were established and emphasized by Freud himself, being sometimes revisited and other 
times refused by psychoanalytic authors. Refusal of this distinction would be justified by the fact 
that transference and countertransference are not understood as distinguished or separated 
processes, with one relating to the patient and the other to the analyst. It would, though, 
compose the analytical field as a whole, as a broader phenomenon that is the transferential 
relationship. In this way, as was defined by Green, “the relationship between the two concepts 
is something else than the sum of attributes of each object composing the relationship” (Green, 
2008, p. 77). 
Lacan (1958) is even more vehement when he defends the “conceptual impropriety” of 
the concept of countertransference. He thinks that the concept of countertransference is 
included in the conceptual fabric of the concept of transference and that they are one single 
phenomenon in the sense that they conjugate the same experience, though they are usually 
understood separately (Lacan, 1964). 
Despite ferocious criticism, the concept has been developed throughout history and 
inspired contemporaneous authors such as Thomas Ogden (1994), for whom there is an 
intersubjective dialectic relationship between the analyst and the analysand that engenders 
what he called the analytical third, that is, a shared creation of the analyst-patient pair, a 
transferential-countertransferential field composed of, among others, the associative 
production of both. 
Authors who defend referring to the analyst’s affectivity as a clinical tool emphasize the 
importance of psychical openness on the part of the analyst to allow himself to become 
affectively disturbed by the analytical process. That is the analyst’s skill in emptying him/herself 
through the process of encountering the patient, thus, becoming psychically open, poriferous 
and permeable to the analysand’s transference (Thompson, 2002). 
A case of frontal aphasia treated as part of our research allows a brief demonstration of 
some of the specificities of clinical practice involving patients with neurological issues. Let us see 
how the analyst, from the transferential relationship, can use affective communication as a 
clinical tool. Our patient was diagnosed with frontal aphasia. His clinical condition had developed 
after the removal of a bone tumor from the left frontal region of his brain and was characterized 
by disorganization in speech production and limitations in reasoning flexibility, coupled with 
difficulties regarding initiative, programming and planning. 
The patient was referred to treatment because of depressive symptoms as a 
consequence not only from severe cognitive loss but also, according to him, from the recent 
rupture of a love relationship. He reported that his girlfriend, whom he had started dating a few 
months before the surgery for the removal of the tumor, broke up with him after he was released 
from the hospital. The sequence of losses made him feel that his “world and heart were broken”. 
Regarding his cognitive limitations, he declared the following with sorrow: “I think about 
something and at the moment I am going to say it the thing is not in my mind anymore. The same 
occurs when I am writing”. However, though he had difficulty communicating, the aphasia was 
not an obstacle when he talked about the end of his relationship. He used several long sessions 
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to speak of the pain he felt because of the loss of his girlfriend. “The words don’t disappear when 
I talk about her because they are inside my heart. How am I going to be able to take her out of 
here inside?” 
Initially, the analytical work involved creating subtitles and shades for the feelings of loss 
and abandonment he was experiencing during the sessions. Throughout the treatment, the 
recent experiences of loss started to update his earlier feelings of anguish regarding his first 
object relationships. He asserted the following in a certain session: “my world was never made 
of bright colors, although it was once colorful. But now everything is colorless. It is gray 
everywhere”. These patient’s words were followed by a continuous crying, while he cringed on 
the armchair, holding his feet and folding over himself, such as a baby in the fetal position. In 
that moment, the sensation provoked in the analyst was that of facing a vulnerable child, 
reminding her of an episode from the childhood of the patient, marked by his mother’s daily 
commuting to work when he was left babysitting his younger brother. “I have the sensation that 
the gray hue everywhere did not start after the surgery, nor when your girlfriend broke up the 
relationship”, says the analyst. “I have the impression that this gray hue has been there since 
when your mother stayed out the whole day”. He cries and confirms that his childhood time was 
also gray. “My mother did similar to her [ex-girlfriend]. When she returned she would only take 
care of my brother. He was little and needed her more, but I also needed her”. In this way, he 
was able to assess the traumatic memories he experienced in his childhood. Updating the feeling 
of vulnerability allowed the patient to start mourning, which occurred not only in regard to his 
brain impairment but also as an attempt to elaborate on early traumas, which would have fixated 
him in the position of a helpless child. 
The analyst, in allowing himself to be touched by the affective modulations of the patient, 
uses his perceptual and cognitive processes to name the affective contents aroused by the 
countertransference. When dealing with patients whose skills of recall and representation are 
limited due to brain injury, it is up to the analyst to use affective experiences as a construction 
tool in analysis. In this way, the analyst’s role would be to establish a transferential field with 
these patients in order to create privileged access to affect as a clinical tool. When possible, this 
type of work allows some sort of psychic management of the experienced ruptures and issues 
prior to the disease, as well as their elaboration and the consequent opening to new psychic 
investments. 
For patients with neurologic impairment, this non-interpretational handling may 
cooperate for the reestablishment of a state of unity, ie, of me-world coherence. Therefore, in 
these cases, the setting is in first plan as what matters here are constancy, support and the 
analyst’s empathic adaptation to the needs of the still not integrated patient (Winnicott, 1969). 
This includes the totality of the elements composing the analytical relationship, among which 
countertransference, as mentioned above, deserves highlighting. From a broader perspective, 
countertransference is not limited to the positive or negative aspects produced by transference. 
It goes beyond, comprehending the analyst’s whole mental functioning. 
In other words, the conduction of analyses of patients with neurological impairments 
demands that the analyst detach from a position primarily based on listening to repressed 
unconscious material. The analyst should adopt a more active attitude, taking part in the 
analytical process with his/her sensitive presence and offering him/herself as some kind of 
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representational prosthesis for someone who no longer has the necessary cognitive skills to 
sustain a minimally consistent representation grid. 
Facing with such clinical impasses, we suppose that the essential challenge for the 
direction of the analytical work with those patients is, as suggested by Fédida (2009) regarding 
cases refractory to analysis, that the analyst asks him/herself about “his power to discover for 
him a original language” (p.156). Using the same diapason as the not yet integrated patient, in 
an empathic encounter, the analyst participates in the session with his own psychic, perceptual, 
and cognitive processes, thus becoming part of the integrative process. In these cases, it is 
necessary that the analyst is not restricted to free-floating listening but, inversely, is carefully 
open to all the little clinical details so that, with his/her sensitive presence, he/she may participate 
in the integration process. Therefore, higher flexibility on the part of the analyst matters the 
most here not only to address verbal representations but also to address other forms of psychic 
movement, be it through the eyes, voice tone, gestures, or images available to the analyst’s 
psyche as an effect of the transferential encounter in the analytical context. By making available 
some of him/herself through his/her physical and psychical presence, the analyst lends cognitive 
and perceptual elements that may gradually enable the rehabilitation of the not yet integrated 
subject’s potentialities and stimulate the construction of new psychical functioning patterns 
other than the repetition compulsion imposed by the experience of becoming ill. 
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The irrepresentable, the repetition and the death instinct: psychoanalysis and neurologic 
illness  
 
Abstract 
 
Clinical practice involving the treatment of neurological patients with cognitive impairments has 
usually had neurology and neuropsychology as its main axes, neglecting psychotherapeutic 
approaches and prioritizing the rehabilitation of cognitive functions. This essay aims at exploring 
what may be learned about the psychic organization of neurological patients from the 
perspective of psychoanalytical treatment, as opposed to evaluating the validity of this method. 
We introduce the argument that the psychopathological scene developed after the experience 
and perception of cognitive impairment is placed at the intersection of narcissistic identity 
pathologies and classic traumatic neuroses, since the traumatic blow established by the disease 
destabilizes the sense of identity and the continuity of the subjective existence, thus dissolving 
the cohesion of the ego and both intensifying the action of and amplifying the effects of the 
death instinct. Consequently, we assume that the concept of the death instinct, far from being 
a (self) destructive principle, should be understood as having a fulfilling role in psychic survival 
in the face of a traumatic flood. Finally, we approach a variety of technical considerations and 
offer a few observations on the aspects of countertransference. 
 
Keywords: Traumatic neurosis. Narcissistic identity disorder. Neurologic illness. 
 
O irrepresentável, a repetição e o instinto de morte: psicanálise e doença neurológica.  
 
Resumo 
 
A prática clínica envolvendo o tratamento de pacientes neurológicos com deficiências cognitivas 
usualmente teve na neurologia e na neuropsicologia seus eixos principais, negligenciando 
abordagens psicoterapêuticas e priorizando a reabilitação de funções cognitivas. Este ensaio 
pretende explorar o que pode ser aprendido sobre a organização psíquica de pacientes 
neurológicos na perspectiva do tratamento psicanalítico, em vez de avaliar a validade desse 
método. Apresentamos o argumento de que o cenário psicopatológico desenvolvido após a 
experiência e a percepção de comprometimento cognitivo se situa na interseção entre as 
patologias narcísico-identitárias e as neuroses traumáticas clássicas, uma vez que o golpe 
traumático estabelecido pela doença desestabiliza o sentimento de identidade e de 
continuidade na existência, dissolvendo a coesão do ego, intensificando a ação e ampliando os 
efeitos da pulsão de morte. Consequentemente, entendemos que o conceito de pulsão de morte, 
longe de ser um princípio (auto) destrutivo, deve ser entendido como cumprindo um papel na 
sobrevivência psíquica em face de uma inundação traumática. Finalmente, abordamos uma 
variedade de considerações técnicas e oferecemos algumas observações sobre os aspectos da 
contratransferência. 
 
Palavras-chave: Neurose traumática. Patologia narcísico-identitária. Adoecimento neurológico. 
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L'irrepresentable, la repetition et l'instinct de la mort: psychanalyse et maladie neurologique. 
 
Résumé 
 
La pratique clinique impliquant le traitement des patients neurologiques ayant une déficience 
cognitive avait habituellement sur la neurologie et neuropsychologie ses axes principaux, en 
négligeant les approches psychothérapeutiques et en priorisant la réhabilitation des fonctions 
cognitives. Cet essai vise à explorer ce qui peut être appris sur l’organisation psychique des 
patients neurologiques du point de vue du traitement psychanalytique, au lieu d’évaluer la 
validité de cette méthode. Nous présentons l’argument selon lequel le scénario 
psychopathologique développé après l’expérience et la perception de la déficience cognitive est 
situé à l’intersection des troubles identitaires et narcissiques et des névroses traumatiques 
classiques, puisque le coup traumatique établi par la maladie déstabilise le sens de l’identité et 
de la continuité dans l’existence, dissolvant la cohésion du moi, intensifiant l’action et amplifiant 
les effets de la pulsion de mort. Par conséquent, nous comprenons que le concept de pulsion de 
mort, loin d’être un principe (auto) destructeur, doit être compris comme jouant un rôle dans la 
survie psychique face à un déluge traumatique. Enfin, nous couvrons une variété de 
considérations techniques et offrons quelques observations sur les aspects du contre-transfert. 
 
Mots-clés: Névrose traumatique. Pathologies narcissique-identitaires. Maladie neurologique. 
 
El irrepresentable, la repetición y el instinto de muerte: psicanálisis y enfermedad neuroló-
gica. 
 
Resumen 
 
La práctica clínica que involucra el tratamiento de pacientes neurológicos con deficiencias 
cognitivas usualmente tuvo en la neurología y en la neuropsicología sus ejes principales, 
descuidando de abordajes psicoterapéuticos y priorizando la rehabilitación de funciones 
cognitivas. Este ensayo pretende explorar lo que puede ser aprendido sobre la organización 
psíquica de pacientes neurológicos en la perspectiva del tratamiento psicoanalítico, en lugar de 
evaluar la validez de ese método. Presentamos el argumento de que el escenario 
psicopatológico desarrollado después de la experiencia y la percepción de deficiencias cognitivas 
se sitúa en la intersección entre las patologías narcísico-identitarias y las neurosis traumáticas 
clásicas, una vez que el golpe traumático establecido por la enfermedad desestabiliza el 
sentimiento de identidad y de continuidad en la existencia, disolviendo la cohesión del ego, 
intensificando la acción y ampliando los efectos de la pulsión de muerte. En consecuencia, 
entendemos que el concepto de pulsión de muerte, lejos de ser un principio (auto) destructivo, 
debe ser entendido como cumpliendo un papel en la supervivencia psíquica frente a una 
inundación traumática. Finalmente, abordamos una variedad de consideraciones técnicas y 
ofrecemos algunas observaciones sobre los aspectos de la contratransferencia. 
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